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 1  Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the outsourcing of military and security functions to 
private security contractors (PSCs)
1 has reached unprecedented levels
2 in armed 
conflicts. In a "world that needs security",
3 the private security industry is one of the 
"fastest growing sectors of the economy worldwide",
4 estimated in 2005 to be worth 
one hundred billion US dollars a year.
5  This rise of the private security industry 
should come as no surprise at a time when more th an six million highly skilled 
soldiers were facing demobilisation, and enormous stocks of weapons had fallen into 
private hands.
6 Not even the stigma attached to labels like  "mercenary", "soldier of 
fortune"
7 or "dogs of war"
8 could quell the growing demand for PSCs to  provide a 
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1   Some authors discriminate between private military contractors, private security contractors and 
non-lethal service providers (Brooks 2002 www.ipoaonline.org). For the purposes of this article 
we shall use the generic term "private security contractors" (PSCs) with the caveat that within this 
group there will be those whose activities might range from active combat or passive defence, 
through to non-lethal support. We focus our attention on the individuals rather than the corporate 
entities that PSCs may work for. 
2   In  1991  the  ratio  of  military  personnel  to  private  contractors  active  in  armed  conflicts  was 
estimated  at  50:1;  by  2003  the  ratio  exceeded  10:1(Singer  Corporate  warriors;  Singer  2005 
people.cas.sc.edu; Lombardi 2004 ABAJ 1). Today, contractors working for the United States 
(US) Government outnumber US troops in Iraq, and there are reportedly more ex-British SAS 
troops working as PSCs in Iraq than there are currently serving in the United Kingdom's (UK) 
SAS  force  (Amnesty  International  Date  Unknown  www.amnestyusa.org;  Singer  2006  BJWA 
112). 
3   Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L Law 162. 
4   "With some companies employing well beyond 10 000 staff…the scale [of the private security 
industry] is a wholly new phenomenon" (ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 5). 
5   UN Report 2005. 
6   Singer 2006 BJWA 106; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2609. 
7   Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 307. 
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wide spectrum of services, ranging from the non-contentious
9 to those having "direct 
lethal consequence".
10 While they "tend not to openly advertise their more combat -
like services" PSCs are clearly not "just running the soup kitchens".
11 Their clientele 
includes states;
12  ruthless dictators; respected  private corporations; drug cartels; 
rebel  forces;
13  international  and  re gional  inter -governmental  organisations ";
14 
humanitarian  non-governmental  organisations;
15  movie  directors;  and  defence 
lawyers.
16 PSCs have been deployed in over fifty states,
17 and in the words of David 
Milliband (as British Foreign Secretary): 
 
the  private  military  and  security  company  industry  is  essential,  inevitable  and 
international. It is essential because people need protecting in dangerous countries; 
inevitable,  because  government  cannot  deploy  protection  in  all  theatres;  and 
international, because the market and suppliers are global.
18 
 
It also comes as no surprise that PSCs have been a prominent feature on the African 
continent. Even as we write, reports are emerging from Libya that the ousted Colonel 
                                            
9   In Afghanistan PSCs (like the US based firm Ronco) were contracted to de-mine the fields so 
that local villages could till their fields (Faite 2008 www.icrc.org 1). In Iraq PSCs provided security 
to  engineers  fixing  the  sewer  system,  while  their  colleagues  in  Sudan  flew  in  peacekeeping 
forces (Singer 2006 BJWA 105). In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, PSCs guarded against 
looters and collected the dead (Singer 2006 BJWA 105). 
10   PSCs  have  been  hired  to  "provide  combat,  operational  and  logistical  support  for  military 
operations" (Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 16); to provide air reconnaissance (as is 
the  case  with  the  US-based  firm  Airscan  (Faite  2008  www.icrc.org  1);  to  maintain  weapons 
systems;  to  protect  premises  and  personnel;  to  train  and  advise  military  and  police  forces 
(Beyani and Lilly 2001 www.ssrnetwork.net 11); to gather intelligence; to oversee the detention 
and  interrogation  of  prisoners;  to  provide  security  services  and  conduct  crime  prevention 
activities; and in some instances to participate in combat (FCO 2009 www.fco.gov.uk; ICRC 2006 
www.icrc.org). 
11   Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 884. 
12   During the period 1994-2002 the US Government concluded three thousand contracts with US-
based private security firms, at an estimated cost of three hundred billion US dollars (Singer 
2006 BJWA 106), and in Iraq the green zone was defended almost exclusively by PSCs (Frye 
2005 Fordham L Rev 2610). 
13   It is interesting to note that prior to 9/11 PSCs were reportedly employed by two groups linked to 
al-Qaeda (Singer 2006 BJWA 114). 
14   Gillard 2006 IRRC 525; Singer 2006 BJWA 107. Included in this category is the United Nations. 
15   Bjork and Jones TWQ 780; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2619. While not many non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are prepared to admit their use of PSCs for fear of losing their funding by 
being  associated  with  these  "dogs  of  war",  those  NGOs  operating  in  failed  states  are 
nevertheless instructed to "quietly hire" the services of PSCs (Singer 2006 BJWA 109). Many 
NGOs prefer to hire PSCs rather than to pay off "local security" or local warlords to guarantee 
their safety (Singer 2006 BJWA 110.) Controversially some NGOs have even been reported to 
hire PSCs not only for the defence of their staff, but also for the use of PSC snipers (Singer 2006 
BJWA 108). 
16   Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 227. 
17   Including  "Afghanistan,  Angola,  Croatia,  Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  Iraq  and  Sierra  Leone"  (Frye  2005 
Fordham L Rev 2619; Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 335). 
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Gadaffi hired mercenaries from Chad, Nigeria and Sudan to oppose the National 
Transitional Council in Libya.
19 As Brookes explains, with  
 
the  West  reluctant  to  commit  its  militaries,  the  only  way  that  Africa  is  going  to 
acquire the military capability to end its many conflicts is to contract the services 
from elsewhere.
20 
 
In "militarily advanced countries"
21 the excess retired and ex-military personnel
22 who 
have  had  valuable  conflict  experience  and  have  few  civilian  employment 
opportunities  provide  a  vast  pool  of  personnel  readily  available  at  "remarkably 
affordable prices".
23 Moreover, firms providing PSCs pride themselves on the fact 
that they  "can often undertake operations faster, more cost effectively "
24 and with 
fewer  personnel  and  bureaucratic  delays  th an  traditional  state  armies  and  UN 
peacekeepers.
25  When  the  genocide  in  Rwanda  was  imminent,  Executive 
Outcomes
26  drew up a business plan that could have had  "armed troops on the 
ground within 14 days", at a cost of six hundred thousand US dollars a day.
27 In the 
end the UN relief operation, which cost three million US dollars a day, came too late 
to save the many hundred thousand victims.
28 In the words of Mr Beese of UK based 
Armorgroup, "if you want cost effective solutions to humanitarian emergencies and 
military overstretch, we're your guys".
29 
 
                                            
19   Reuters Africa 2011 af.reuters.com. 
20   Brooks 2000/1 Conflict Trends 33. 
21   Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 76. 
22   The industry is also a windfall for unemployed ex-servicemen, who stand to earn easily ten times 
what local security guards are paid in Africa (IRIN 2008 www.irinnews.org). During the Executive 
Outcomes operation in Sierra Leone a soldier's salary ranged from US$ 2000 to US$ 13000 per 
month (Hough 2007 ASR 19). 
23   Hiring  ex-army  personnel  from  South  Africa  and  Namibia  is  five  or  six  times  cheaper  than 
employing Americans to do the same job, and Southeast Asia and Latin America also provide 
fertile grounds for hiring PSCs (Brooks 2000/1 Conflict Trends 34; IRIN 2008 www.irinnews.org). 
24   When Executive Outcomes were deployed in Sierra Leone their bill came to thirty-six million US 
dollars  as  compared  with  the  UN's  peacekeepers,  which  cost  three  million  US  dollars  a  day 
(Singer 2006 BJWA 111). 
25   Wright and Brooke 2007 ASR 108. 
26   Executive Outcomes is a private security firm which was based in South Africa and manned 
mostly by former South African Defence Force members. 
27   Singer 2006 BJWA 111. 
28   Singer 2006 BJWA 111. 
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While some hail PSCs as the world's future peacekeepers
30 acting as a "stabilising 
force",
31 others challenge their legitimacy, maintaining that they are no more than the 
21st century's mercenaries,  "recycled",
32"repackaged",
33  who come armed with a 
business  model,  "publicly  listed  companies ",
34  corporate  websites,  and  slick 
corporate identities.
35  Admittedly,  the private security boom has motivated some 
previously  mercenary-type  operatives  to  re -invent  themselves  as  supposedly 
legitimate private security companies.
36 Whichever view one might hold, one thing is 
certain,  the  "existing  international  legal  regimes "  do  not  even  "contemplate  the 
existence"  of  PSCs,  leaving  PSCs  in  the  "same  grey  area  as  the  unlawful 
combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay".
37 
 
Those who adhere to the view that PSCs are modern-day mercenaries would argue 
that we need only look to the two international treaties dealing with the eradication of 
mercenarism proposed by the United Nations
38 and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU),
39 for guidance on how to approach the issue of PSCs. If this is a compelling 
position one would expect that the majority of states who are party to these two 
conventions would have domestic legislation in place regulating the activities of 
PSCs. Instead what we find is that only  one (Italy) of the fifty-four states that have 
ratified either the  UN Mercenary Convention or the OAU Mercenaries Convention 
has taken any steps at a domestic level to ban or regulate the activities of PSCs,
40 
which  we  would  argue  supports  the  view  that  the   label  "mercenary"  and  its 
                                            
30   Lilly 2000 www.unidir.org 58. Cameron 2006 IRRC 863. 
31   Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 313. 
32   Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 77 and 91. 
33   Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 876. 
34   Palomba 2009 www.e-IR.info 1. 
35   Singer 2006 BJWA 105; Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 2; Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 36. 
36   Bjork and Jones 2005 TWQ. 
37   Singer 2006 BJWA 116; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2637. 
38   UN Mercenary Convention; Fallah 2006 IRRC 603. 
39   The OAU  Mercenary Convention entered  into force in on 22  April 1985  and  to date only 30 
Members of the African Union have ratified the convention. 
40   At the moment only South Africa and the United States (US) (two of the major suppliers of PSC 
personnel and management) have any domestic legislation aimed at PSCs (Frye 2005 Fordham 
L Rev 2645). The UK (another major source of PSCs) has drafted a Green paper but has yet to 
draft legislation  on  the subject. At the moment it appears the UK is favouring the regulatory 
framework which was adopted by the US (Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 667).The other major 
suppliers  of  "management  and  operational  personnel"  for  PSCs  come  from  "France;  Israel; 
Central and Eastern Europe", and as yet only Italy has passed domestic legislation aimed at 
regulating PSCs (Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 651). S BOSCH AND M MARITZ                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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accompanying legal regimes are not particularly useful when dealing with the issue 
of PSCs.
41 
 
South Africa has arguably the most aggressive regime of domestic legislation aimed 
at regulating the activities of PSCs, which is not surprising after it inadvertently found 
that it was a major exporter of PSCs
42 in the post-apartheid era. The Regulation of 
Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (hereafter the FMA) entered into force in 
1998 and was the government's hard-line response after Executive Outcomes made 
headlines around the world for their intervention in Sierra Leone in 1995. Eight years 
later,  in  response  to  concerns  that  the  FMA  was  proving  unworkable,  the 
government promulgated the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of 
Certain  Activities  in  the  Country  of  Armed  Conflict  Act  27  of  2006  (hereafter the 
PMA). While the PMA received the necessary presidential assent in November 2007, 
over three years later it has yet to achieve the presidential proclamation necessary 
for the PMA to repeal the FMA and enter into force. 
 
South Africa appears to be alone in its mission to adopt such an aggressive stance 
towards regulating the private security industry. It is unlikely that a few pieces of 
domestic legislation, like those adopted by South Africa, will have any noticeable 
effect on the presence of PSCs as a feature of current and future armed conflicts. 
The  unique  situation  posed  by  South  Africa's  legislation  poses  some  interesting 
questions which we will explore. We begin by looking at the role played by PSCs in 
armed  conflicts,  and  the  status  afforded  them  by  international  humanitarian  law 
(IHL).  We  turn  then  to  the  issue  of  prohibited  mercenarism,  investigating  if  the 
actions of PSCs serve to group them with mercenaries (as defined by  Additional 
Protocol I [AP I] and the two international Mercenary Conventions).
43 We then shift 
our focus to the South African situation and discuss the ambit of application of both 
the FMA and its proposed successor, the PMA, exploring how these two pieces of 
legislation measure up to international law obligations regarding mercenarism. We 
discuss whether or not it is likely that the FMA and the proposed PMA might be 
successfully used to prosecute PSCs, and what penalties PSCs might face. Lastly 
                                            
41   Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2642. 
42   Holmqvist 2005 SIPRI 50. 
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we consider the constitutional challenges which might emerge as the FMA, PMA and 
the proposed amendment to section 6 of the South African Citizenship Act (Bill B17 
of  2010)
44  threaten the constitutionally protected rights of South African PSCs to 
practice a profession and enjoy citizenship. 
 
2   The international humanitarian law status of PSCs in armed conflicts
45 
 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the body of law applicable in situations of 
armed conflict.
46 IHL classifies all those who find themselves in a situation of armed 
conflict into specific legal categories.   Nobody who finds themselves in an armed 
conflict "can be outside of the law".
47 They are either combatants (or authorised to 
accompany  the  armed  forces),  or  they  are  civilians.   There  are  many  legal 
consequences which flow from this initial classification . Those labelled civilians, for 
example, are protected from the hostilities, provided they refrain from participating 
directly in the hostilities,
48 while combatants are authorised to parta ke in hostilities 
and cannot be prosecuted for their participation (provided they observe the laws of 
war).
49 With PSCs fast outnumbering traditional armed forces in present day armed 
conflicts there is an urgent need for IHL to address the question of their status and to 
assess their legal right to participate directly in hostilities.
50 
  
While IHL treaties and international human rights law are binding on PSCs operating 
in situations of armed conflict,
51 IHL as it stands makes no reference to PSCs  as 
such. This leaves military  commanders with the unenviable task of assessing the 
status of PSCs on a case-by-case basis, reaching conclusions based largely on the 
specific functions that the particular PSCs are performing.
52 When one reviews the 
list of activities that PSCs have been hired to perform, it is clear that while PSCs are 
                                            
44   Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs 2010 www.pmg.org.za. 
45   For a more extensive discussion of the IHL status of PSCs see Bosch 2007 ASR. 
46   Fleck ″Introduction″ xi. 
47   Pictet Geneva Conventions 51. 
48   Gasser ″Protection of the Civilian Population″ 210. 
49   Ipsen ″Combatants and Non-combatants″ 80. 
50   Cameron 2006 IRRC 582. 
51   IHL is unusual in that it applies "to all individuals who find themselves in a territory in which there 
is  an  armed  conflict  (international  or  non-international),  whether  they  are  state  or  non-state 
actors"  (Cameron  2007  www.baselgovernance.org;  Singer  2006  BJWA  115;  ICRC  2008 
www.icrc.org 39). 
52   ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 14. S BOSCH AND M MARITZ                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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not typical uniformed combatants in the way that IHL understands that term, they are 
also not your regular civilians. When one considers that states make extensive use 
of PSCs, it is worth considering whether PSCs are effectively incorporated into the 
armed forces by way of contractual agreements.
53  
 
In terms of IHL there is certainly no legal obstacle to a state's promulgating domestic 
legislation endorsing the incorporation of PSCs into the armed forces.
54 All that IHL 
requires of states is that they ensure that these PSCs distinguish themselves from 
civilians, carry their arms openly, observe IHL, are subject to command responsibility 
and internal disciplinary systems, and that the oppos ition forces are notified of their 
incorporation.
55  However, if one looks closely at state practice, it is evident that 
states  do  not  consider  commercial  contracts,  on  their  own,  to  be  sufficient  to 
incorporate PSCs into the ranks of the armed forces. In fa ct, the majority of states 
making use of PSCs go to great lengths to  emphasise that they are merely civilian 
contractors, authorised to accompany the armed forces.
56 Very often PSCs are hired 
precisely to circumvent "national laws that would prevent [states] from sending their 
own armed forces" into a conflict.
57 Some writers suggest that the unspoken motive 
behind a state's use of PSCs to  “do their dirty work” is the goal of avoiding "direct 
legal responsibility" for their actions.
58 For the most part, then, while states that hire 
PSCs might be responsible for their actions, the PSCs themselves will not be able to 
claim IHL combatant status (as persons incorporated into the state 's armed forces) 
                                            
53   Gillard suggests that the following factors might indicate affiliation to the armed forces of a state: 
"whether they have complied with national procedures for enlistment or conscription, where they 
exist; whether they are employees of the department of defence; whether they are subject to 
military discipline and justice; whether they form part of and are subject to the military chain of 
command and control; whether they form part of the military hierarchy; whether they have been 
issued  with  the  identity  cards  envisaged  by  the  Third  Geneva  Convention  or  other  forms  of 
identification similar to those of 'ordinary' members of the armed forces; and whether they wear 
uniforms" (Gillard 2006 IRRC 533). 
54   Gillard  2006  IRRC  534;  Cameron  2007  www.baselgovernance.org  3;  a  4A(2)  Geneva 
Convention III (GC III). 
55   Article 4A(2) GC III; a 43(3) Additional Protocol I (AP I). 
56   Department of Defence 2005 www.dtic.mil. 
57   Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org. 
58   Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 2. We would argue that if this is indeed their motivation, then 
these states have been ill advised, since state responsibility may be invoked as a result of the 
contract alone, giving rise to liability on the part of states hiring PSCs (Ipsen ″Combatants and 
Non-combatants″  69;  Cameron  2006  IRRC  584;  Gillard  2006  IRRC  533  and  ICRC  2008 
www.icrc.org 11). For a more detailed discussion of the issue of state responsibility see Bosch 
2008 CILSA; Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 8. S BOSCH AND M MARITZ                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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because of the deliberate refusal by states to officially incorporate them into their 
armed forces. 
 
There is another category of personnel which IHL recognises and which, although 
not  enjoying  full  combatant  privilege,  is  nevertheless  very  closely  aligned  to  the 
armed forces of a state, much as PSCs are contracted by states. This IHL category 
is  termed  "persons  accompanying  the  armed  forces".
59  These personnel provide 
specialist expertise
60 but are not fully fledged members of the armed forces, they do 
not wear uniform, they are not armed ,  and  they  are not permitted to en gage in 
hostilities in any direct way.
61 Within the category of  "persons accompanying the 
armed  forces "  we  find  civilian  members  of  military  aircraft  crews;  war 
correspondents; supply contractors; reconstruction contractors; members of labour 
units; and those providing services for the welfare of the armed forces .
62 Many of 
these functions are  in fact  being performed by today 's PSCs. These essentially 
civilian contractors retain their civilian status, despite the fact that their assistance is 
used to win a mi litary advantage over the opposition.
63  Despite the fact that IHL 
views these  "persons accompanying the armed forces " as civilians, they do enjoy 
one privilege normally reserved for the armed forces: that of prisoner of war (POW) 
status if detained for security reasons.
64 For this reason "persons accompanying the 
armed forces" carry with them an identity card which confirms their status and POW 
privilege.
65 While PSCs might be providing  services similar to the services provided 
by those who traditionally accompany the armed forces, there are two obstacles to 
PSCs'  claiming  this  IHL  status.  Firstly,  PSCs  do  not  carry  the  recognised 
identification cards reflecting this status, and secondly they would have to prove that 
their actions did not amount to direct participation in hostilities. A further difficulty for 
PSCs operating in armed conflicts of an internal nature is that this IHL category of 
"persons  accompanying  the  armed  forces "  applies  only  to  "international  armed 
                                            
59   Article 4A(4) GC III; Walker and Whyte 2005 ICLQ 675. 
60   When one looks at the tasks normally performed by those accompanying the armed forces it is 
clear that the drafters of  GC III did not intend to  include in this group  "persons carrying out 
activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities" (Gillard 2006 IRRC 537). 
61   Ipsen ″Combatants and Non-combatants″ 95. 
62   Article 4A(4) GC III. 
63   Parrish 2007 www.polisci.wisc.edu. 
64   Article 4A(4) GC III. 
65   Ipsen ″Combatants and Non-combatants″ 95; a 4A(4) and Annex IV A GC III. S BOSCH AND M MARITZ                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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conflicts". Moreover PSCs would need to provide their services to the armed forces, 
not  merely  the  state,  in  order  to  qualify  for  this  status.
66  As  for  the  issue  of 
identification, it is accepted that when the  Geneva Convention drafters included the 
provision regarding the identity card for those accompanying the armed forces it was 
agreed that  
 
possession of one was a supplementary safeguard for the person concerned, but 
not an indispensable prerequisite for being granted prisoner of war status.
67 
 
Having said this, it is clear that where PSCs are directly participating in hostilities or 
where they are hired by non-state actors without any affiliation to the armed forces,
68 
they will not be able to claim this IHL status. 
 
If PSCs are not incorporated into the armed forces or are unable to satisfy the 
requirement of "persons accompanying the armed forces " they will, by default, be 
classified as civilians. This default position is the result of a presumption that exists 
in IHL that where there is  "doubt a person shall be considered to be a civilian ".
69 
Those  PSCs who fall into this default position  are subject to  one very important 
restriction: with the exception of the  levée en masse, civilians are not permitted to 
participate directly in hostilities.
70 Provided they do not take part in the hostilities, 
PSCs are to be respected, shielded from attack , and may not be  "taken prisoner 
without sufficient reason".
71 Civilians who take an active part in hostilities, in violation 
of this prohibition, open themselves to attack from the opposition acting in self 
defence  during  and  for  such  time  as  they  continue  to  actively  participate  in 
hostilities.
72 
 
It is "safe to conclude that the majority of PSCs hired by states " will fall into the IHL 
category  of  the  ordinary  citizen.
73  Admittedly,  PSCs  are  inherently  a  different 
category of civilian from those envisaged in the IHL conventions. They are clearly not 
                                            
66   ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org 36. 
67   Gillard 2006 IRRC 537. 
68   Cameron 2006 IRRC 593. 
69   Article 50(1) AP I, which defines a civilian as any person who is not a combatant. 
70   Gasser ″Protection of the Civilian Population″ 210; a 27(1) Geneva Convention IV (GC IV). 
71   Article 27(1) Geneva Convention I (GC I); a 51(2) AP I; a 13(2) Additional Protocol II (AP II). 
72   Article 51(8) AP I; ICRC 2008 www.icrc.org  14. 
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wholly innocent civilians going about their daily routine, caught in the crossfire. They 
have,  after  all,  deliberately  chosen  to  place  themselves  in  the  line  of  fire  in  an 
attempt to have an impact on the outcome of hostilities. PSCs are for the most part 
armed, a fact which begs the question: if they are essentially civilians, when are they 
permitted  to  use  their  weapons  without  being  seen  to  be  participating  directly  in 
hostilities? To this end, PSCs will need to familiarise themselves with the ICRC's 
Interpretive  Guide
74  as  to  what  actions  might  amount  to  "direct  participation  in 
hostilities". Singer,
75  in his research into PSCs ,  provides a helpful categorisation, 
using the analogy of a spear, to illustrate the various levels of involvement which 
PSCs might undertake in armed conflicts: 
 
At the tip of the spear are the "military provider firms that provide implementation 
and command services", in the mid section are the "military consultancy firms which 
provide advisory and training services", and lastly are the "military support firms 
which provide non-lethal aid and assistance".
76 
 
Clearly  the  most  problematic  groups,  in  so  far  as  the  prohibition  against  direct 
participation in hostilities is concerned, are those that occupy the tip of the spear. At 
the tip of the spear we find those PSCs who are employed to undertake "targeted 
killings";
77 operate high-tech weapons; or use computers to direct a weapon to strike 
a target remotely,
78 and it has always been held that these actions amount to direct 
participation in hostilities
79. The first conclusion we can draw then is that if PSCs are 
for the most part considered to be civilians, then whether or not they are found to be 
in violation of the prohibition against direct participation in hostilities will depend on 
the particular role which they play in the armed conflict. 
 
It is uncontroversial that IHL, as it stands at present, permits the use of civilian 
contractors in "a civil police role in occupied territory",
80 and in carrying out this type 
of function PSCs  "might be authorised to use force when absolutely necessary to 
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75   Baker and Gumedze 2007 ASR 3. 
76   Baker and Gumedze 2007 ASR 3. 
77   Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
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defend  persons  or  property".
81  Likewise,  PSCs  employed  as  guards  for 
reconstruction companies would be entitled to  use force in self   defence  and to 
"protect the facilities they are guarding, as long as they did so in a defensive manner 
and employed no more force than was strictly necessary ".
82  PSCs carrying out 
"support and logistical activities "  which are normally carr ied out by civilians, like 
"catering, construction and maintenance of bases ",  will not be considered to be 
participating directly in hostilities.
83 Similarly PSCs employed to conduct checkpoint 
searches would not violate the prohibition against direct parti cipation in hostilities, 
provided they were not authorised to use a weapon.
84 Moreover, both Faite
85 and the 
ICRC's
86  authoritative  commentary  conclude  that  "foreign  advisers  and  military 
technicians" are never said to participate directly in hostilities. 
 
In some instances it will be the PSC 's location that will determine his or her IHL 
status. So, for example, it is uncontroversial that PSCs carrying out civilian guarding 
duties at purely civilian sites or otherwise protected sites like schools, churches and  
hospitals could never be said to be participating directly in hostilities.
87 The same will 
not be true of PSCs who position themselves at purely military objectives like an 
armoury or command centre belonging to the opposition forces.
88 The presence of 
PSCs  at  a  legitimate  military  target  "aids  the  war  effort  and  constitutes  direct 
participation in hostilities".
89  Much like workers  in  a munitions factory, while the 
civilian workers and guarding PSCs may not be personally targeted (because they 
retain their civilian protection from attack), the military objectives at which they are 
situated remain open to attack.
90 IHL does not "draw a distinction between offensive 
or  defensive  operations ".  Consequently  there  is  no  guarantee  of  protection  by 
claiming that the PSCs are merely performing guard duties. The truth of the matter is 
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that if they are deployed at a military objective they are participating in hostilities.
91 
Having said that,  a commander is always expected to be aware of the principle of 
proportionality in  justification for an attack, and he or she should thus exercise 
greater caution if a site is inhabited predominantly by civilian PSCs.
92  
 
If PSCs located at civilian sites are not considered to be participating in hostilities 
and PSCs located at military objectives are classified as participating in hostilities, 
what then of PSCs guarding dual-use sites like communications networks, power 
sources, oil refineries, transportation infrastructure (ports and airports), and the like - 
facilities which serve both the civilian population and the armed forces? In terms of 
IHL there is a clear presumption in favour of protected status for dual-use sites.
93 
While that presumption persists it seems intuitively right that PSCs guarding dual -
use sites be afforded greater p rotection than those located at single -use military 
installations, in other words transferring the  presumption of protected status (in 
respect of the site) to PSCs guarding the site and granting them civilian status until 
such time as the status of the ins tallation can be determined to   be  offering  any 
military advantage.  To this end it  would be useful if IHL drew some distinction 
between defensive and offensive guarding. At the moment AP  I states only that an 
"attack means any act of violence…whether in offence of defence" (article 49(1)). 
This  leaves  PSCs  who  are  defensively  guarding  dual-use  sites  in  an  unenviable 
position.  In  terms  of  IHL  their  defensive  guarding  would  amount  to  an  "attack" 
(thereby constituting unlawful direct participation in hostilities), whether the site is 
determined to be a military objective or not.
94 
 
So, in terms of IHL, PSCs may, depending on their location and particular activities, 
be assigned differing status. For the most part PSCs will not be able to claim 
combatant status under IHL because of the deliberate refusal by states to officially 
incorporate them into their armed forces, although in law there is no legal obstacle to 
states passing legislation to incorporate PSCs into their traditional armed forces.  As 
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for claims that they are similar to civilian contractors or "persons accompanying the 
armed forces", PSCs might be classified as such provided they could overcome the 
requirement of carrying a recognised identification card reflecting this status, and 
prove  that  they  were  not  participating  directly  in  hostilities.  This  option  will  not, 
however,  be  available  to  PSCs  who  are  hired  by  non-state  actors  without  any 
affiliation to the armed forces.
95 As for claims that they are civilians, this would be 
sustainable provided they  were only guarding  civilian locations and refrained from 
any direct participation in hostilities. As soon as they are located at single -use 
military  sites  their  presence  at  a  legitimate  military  target  would  render  them 
vulnerable to attack. Those PSCs found guarding dual-use sites would be afforded 
civilian status until such time as the status of the installation is deemed to offer any 
military advantage and for so long as they refrained from using force. 
 
3  PSCs: mercenaries by another name? 
 
When private security companies like Executive Outcomes undertake an assignment 
in  mineral-rich  territories  and  are  paid  by  way  of  mining  concessions,  many 
commentators conclude that they are really just mercenaries by another name. In 
this section we aim to unpack the IHL and treaty law definition of a mercenary in the 
hope of either confirming or dismissing these claims. 
 
The oldest treaty reference to mercenaries can be found in the Hague Convention of 
1907
96 that was drafted in response to concerns that the activiti es of mercenaries 
would compromise the right of  "post-colonial states to self determination ".
97 While 
Hague  V  does  not  criminalise  mercenary  activities,  it  does  stipulate  that  neutral 
states  are  to  refrain  from  assisting  mercenaries  or  permitting  the  recruitment  of 
mercenaries  on  their  territory.
98  Having said this,  however, nothing in  Hague  V 
prohibits mercenaries from passing through a neutral state's territory.
99 It was only in 
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1977  that  African  delegates  to  the  drafting  negotiations  of  AP  I  championed  the 
inclusion of article 47, which sought to deny mercenaries the privileges associated 
with lawful combatant status.
100 The inclusion of article 47 was met with considerable 
resistance and some very influential states (most notably the US) refused to ratify AP 
I  citing  this  very  provision  as  its  reason  for  not  ratifying  it.
101  Some academics 
maintain that the poor state response to article 47 of  AP  I,  alongside  the  poor 
ratification levels and very apathetic enforcement of the  UN and OAU Mercenary 
Conventions,
102  has led some to conclude that the conventions are indicative of 
"anti-customary  law".
103  Henckaerts
104  concedes  that  while  the  definition  of  a 
mercenary  (as  set  out  in  AP  I  article  47)  is  problematic,  the  principle  that 
"mercenaries  do  not  have  the  right  to  combatant  or  prisoner-of-war  status"  is 
considered to have achieved customary law status applicable in international armed 
conflicts. Whether it is considered custom or not, the application of AP I article 47 is 
certainly  limited  to  international armed  conflicts,  leaving  unanswered  the  issue of 
how one defines a mercenary in non-international armed conflicts.
105 If controversy 
surrounds the customary status of provisions which prohibit mercenaries, how much 
more so can the case be made against the international c riminalisation of PSCs
106 
which,  we  contend,  will  probably  not  satisfy  the  definitional  requirements  of 
mercenary status. 
 
Despite  UN  General  Assembly  resolutions
107  stating  that  "mercenaries  are 
outlaws"
108  and  "punishable  as  criminals ",
109  and  the  1970  General  A ssembly 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation amongst States, which claims that  "states have a duty to refrain from 
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organising armed groups, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of 
another state",
110 IHL has had little success in criminalising mercenary activities. To 
date mercenarism alone is still not a prosecutable offence under IHL .  At best, 
mercenaries  are  denied  combatant  and  POW  status.
111  For  the  most  part  this 
omission on the part of IHL can be attributed to the fact that the IHL definition of a 
"mercenary" is widely regarded as unworkable,
112 "if not impossible".
113 Even if the 
definition  w ere  workable,  there  are  still  no  "monitoring  or  enforcement 
mechanisms…at  the  international  law  level"  to  police  mercenary  activities.
114  
Moreover, mercenarism per se does not feature as a prosecutable offence under the 
Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court,
115  unless  the  definition  of 
aggression includes  "some crime of mercenarism itself ".
116  This said,  it must be 
remembered that all individuals, be they official armed forces, mercenaries, or PSCs 
are bound by the rules of IHL and can face individual criminal responsibility for war 
crimes.
117 
 
At present IHL defines a mercenary 
 
as any person who (in the context of an international armed conflict): 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
                                            
110  GA Res 2625.  
111  Once individuals are identified as mercenaries they no longer have the right to claim combatant 
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AP  I  (Fallah  2006  IRRC  606,  Beyani  and  Lilly  2001  www.ssrnetwork.net  15).  The  Geneva 
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(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and,  in  fact,  is  promised,  by  or  on  behalf  of  a  Party  to  the  conflict,  material 
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or  paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled 
by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as 
a member of its armed forces.
118 
 
Given that all six criteria have to be fulfilled cumulatively, the threshold is difficult, if 
not impossible, to cross. If individuals could be shown to have satisfied all six criteria 
they might face prosecution, not for mercenarism per se, but for participating directly 
in hostilities without authorisation, much as civilians will face prosecution as unlawful 
combatants. 
 
These definitional difficulties are not peculiar to IHL. They have also beleaguered the 
two  international  treaties  that  deal  with  mercenarism:  the  UN  Mercenary 
Convention
119  and  the  OAU  Mercenary  Convention.
120  In  adopting  substantially 
similar definitions, these conventions unwittingly took on board the problems which 
IHL had faced in  dealing with mercenaries. The  OAU Mercenary Convention was 
adopted in Libreville on 3 July 1977 and came into force on 22 April 1985. To date 
only thirty members of the African Union have ratified the convention. Four years 
later the UN adopted the  UN Mercenary Convention, which took a further twelve 
years before it entered into force on 20 October 2001. To date it has been ratified or 
acceded to by only thirty-two countries. Notably absent are the Security Council's 
five permanent members and the world's major employers and suppliers of PSCs 
(the US, the UK and SA). Even at the drafting stage there was vehement resistance 
on the part of Western states to proposals that both AP I and the UN Mercenary 
Convention include penalties for states making use of mercenaries.
121 
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While  the  UN  Mercenary  Convention  applies  to  all  conflicts  (both  internal  and 
international),
122 which is an extension of AP I's international application, its definition 
excludes  AP  I's  requirement  (b),  that  the  individual  must  in  fact  take  part  in 
hostilities.
123  The  UN  Mercenary  Convention  includes  within  its  ambit  those  who 
"attempt or recruit, use, finance or train individuals who fulfil these criteria as well as 
their accomplices".
124 The net result is that "no state may use mercenaries under any 
circumstances"  and  captured  mercenaries  may  be  extradited  under  the 
convention.
125 Rather surprisingly the UN Convention does not impose a  
 
total ban on mercenaries; it only prohibits those activities aimed at overthrowing a 
government,  undermining  the  constitutional  order  of  a  state  or  undermining  the 
territorial integrity of a state.
126 
 
It seems that "it is the mercenary's fighting cause that seems to matter to the UN, not 
the  mercenary  as  a  fighter".
127  Without  any  real  "monitoring  and  enforcement 
mechanisms"  it is not surprising that as yet no one has ever faced prosecution 
pursuant to the convention.
128 Even in the few instances where there were relatively 
clear cases of mercenary activity (like the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea), those 
prosecuting the violations chose to charge the accused individuals with firearms and 
immigration  violations
129  rather  than  mercenarism  per  se.  Perhaps  it  is  more 
alarming  still  that  states  who  are  party  to  the  convention  (like  Congo-Brazaville, 
DRC,  Nigeria,  Angola,  and  most  recently  Libya)  have  either  made  use  of 
mercenaries or "permitted or benefited from mercenary trade since ratifying the UN 
Mercenary Convention",
130 reinforcing the academic opinion that the convention is 
actually indicative of "anti customary law".
131 
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As for the OAU Mercenary Convention, it mimics the IHL definition of a mercenary as 
set out in AP I, save for the fact that the compensation promised need not be in 
excess  of  that  paid  ordinary  combatants  (as  set  out  in  AP  I  article  47  (2)(c)). 
"Monetary gain of any amount" is sufficient under the OAU Mercenary Convention.
132 
The scope of application of the  OAU  Mercenary  Convention  is  limited  to  "those 
fighting against a process of self determination, stability or the territorial integrity of 
another [OAU] state".
133 This leaves the door open to AU states to use "mercenaries" 
in other capacities (i.e.  "in internal conflicts or to violate the sovereignty of non -
member  states").
134  Like  the  UN  Mercenary  Convention,  "the  recruitment,  use, 
financing and training of mercenaries" are prosecutable offences, provided the states 
party to the convention have implemented domestic legislation to this effect.
135 On 
the whole, the Convention's obligations have been largely ignored by AU states who 
are party to the convention
136 with none having promulgated legislation, despite the 
fact that it was African states who pressed for the inclusion of article 47 in AP I.
137  
 
However problematic these definitions of a "mercenary" might be, they nevertheless 
remain the international benchmark for a ssessing the behaviour of those PSCs 
accused of mercenarism. Certainly up until 2004, when Shaista Shameem replaced 
Enrique Bernales-Ballesteros as the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism,
138 the 
official  position  of  the  Special  Rapporteur 's  office  was  that   PSCs  were 
mercenaries,
139 a finding that the majority of the international community chose to 
reject.
140 If one looks at the lax application  by signatory states to PSCs  of the two 
anti-mercenary conventions, coupled with the fact that PSCs operate in over fif ty 
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states, often on government contracts,
141 one gets a very  particular picture. State 
practice and opinio juris suggest that under customary international law PSCs are 
not considered mercenaries for want of state practice.
142 International opinion seems 
to suggest that there are significant reasons for treating PSCs and mercenaries 
differently.
143  
 
While neither the  OAU Mercenary Convention nor the UN Mercenary Convention 
mentions PSCs, the UN is seeking  
 
support towards an additional protocol to the Convention to address newer forms of 
mercenarism such as the activities of private military and security companies.
144  
 
Whether such a protocol will ever see the light of day is doubtful, as for the most 
part, those states making use of PSCs and those in which PSCs operate favour the 
drive towards the regulation of PSCs rather than outright prohibition.
145 States seem 
to want to keep their options open in case the need for PSCs arises.
146 In fact, in 
2005 the Swiss government together with the ICRC began a drive towards promoting 
greater respect of IHL and international human rights law on the part of PSCs, 
lending credibility to the position that PSCs are not as a general rule regarded as 
mercenaries.
147  As a result of this initiative, the thirty -five participating states,
148 
NGOs, academics and industry stakeholders supported the Montreux Document
149 
(a set of best practices and regulatory options) after a plenary session in September 
2008. The Montreaux initiative has been endorsed by the HRC 's  "Report of the 
Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self determination".
150 In the working 
group's report it is recommended that states establish a national register of military 
and security companies, and that member states define which types of activity in the 
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military and security field can and cannot be outsourced by the state to the private 
sector.
151 Of course there are those that say that private security companies are only 
pursuing the path of self regulation to  "boost consumer confidence".
152 Whatever 
their motivation, it would seem that at present there is just not the legal or political 
will on the part of states (both weak and strong) to implement  "tough legislation" on 
PSCs.
153 In this regard the legislation aimed at PSCs introduced by South Africa is 
the clear exception. 
 
Not only does state practice and  opinio  juris  suggest  that  PSCs  should  not  be 
labelled mercenaries, but in many ways PSCs fail to fulfill the six criteria required by 
the international definition of a mercenary. The first requirement for mercenarism is 
that PSCs must be "specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict".
154 When one considers that many PSCs are contracted to work for a period 
of time rather than for a specific engagement,
155 they will not satisfy this requirement 
as under the existing IHL regime "a combatant will only be considered a mercenary if 
he is hired for a specific and finite engagement ".
156 Moreover most PSCs are not 
recruited to fight but are contracted to provide advice; training; logistical support; or 
to act as bodyguards. This view is endorsed by the ICRC's commentary on the AP I, 
which states that military advice, training, and technical maintenance of weapons are 
not  "mercenary  activities"  and  do  not  in  and  of  themselves  amount  to  direct 
participation in hostilities.
157 Moreover, there is doubt that the term "armed conflict" in 
this clause of the definition, as it was lifted from article 47 of the AP I and transposed 
into  the  two  Mercenary Conventions,  applies  to  internal conflicts.  Since  the  AP  I 
applies only to international conflicts and the OAU and UN Mercenary Conventions 
do not explicitly define the term, this leaves doubt that the OAU and UN Conventions 
intended their definition also to apply to internal conflicts.
158 There is certainly a good 
case to be made for the contention that the first requirement will be satisfied  only if 
PSCs are recruited specifically to fight in particular international armed conflicts.  
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The second definitional requirement demands that PSCs must "in fact, take a direct 
part in the hostilities".
159 In none of the relevant treaties is there an explanation  of 
what activities might constitute direct participation in hostilities. In 2009 the ICRC 
published  an  Interpretive  Guide
160  on  how  to  interpret  this  phrase.  From  our 
discussion above we would argue that  PSCs could use force in self defence and to 
"protect the facilities they are guarding" without falling foul of the prohibition on direct 
participation.
161  Similarly  PSCs  hired  to  perform  "catering;  construction  and 
maintenance of bases";
162  unarmed checkpoint searches;
163  or to act as  "foreign 
advisers  and  military  technicians "
164  are  never  said  to  participate  directly  in 
hostilities.
165 From the discussions above we would conclude that only when PSCs 
are  located  at  single -use  military  sites;  are  employed  to  undertake  "targeted 
killings";
166 are employed to operate high-tech weapons systems; or use computers 
to direct a weapon to strike a target remotely,
167 can they be said to be participating 
directly in hostilities.
168 As for the rest, those playing a "supportive or defensive role" 
would retain their civilian status.
169 
 
The third requirement is that PSCs must be  motivated purely by excessive material 
compensation.
170  It  is widely accepted that PSCs are earning in excess of their 
military counterparts. PSCs employed in Iraq or Afghanistan can earn in the region of 
                                            
159  It  is  interesting  that  the  UN  Mercenary  Convention  omits  this  requirement,  which  seems  to 
suggest that any involvement in an armed conflict, even if it doesn't rise to the level of direct 
participation in hostilities would constitute mercenary behaviour (Fallah 2006 IRRC 609). This 
means  that  while  PSCs  might  escape  the  mercenary  label  in  terms  of  IHL  and  the  OAU 
Convention, it would be easier to classify them as mercenaries under the UN Convention (that is, 
provided they satisfy the remaining requirements cumulatively). 
160  ICRC 2009 www.icrc.org. 
161  Dworkin 2004 www.crimesofwar.org. 
162  Cameron 2006 IRRC 588-589. 
163  Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
164  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 123. 
165  Faite  2008  www.icrc.org  4,  Salzman  2008  Int'l  L  &  Politics  882;  Sandoz,  Swinarski  and 
Zimmermann ICRC Commentary 579. 
166  Policy Brief 2008 www.hpcr.org 9. 
167  Cameron 2007 www.baselgovernance.org. 
168  Gillard 2006 IRRC 6. 
169  Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann ICRC 57. Zarate suggests that the term mercenary "should 
not  be  applied  to  security  contractors  that  are  hired  by  legitimate  governments,  or  by 
internationally recognised movements of national liberation for either training or combat support" 
(Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 80). 
170  In terms of the OAU Mercenary Convention any compensation will be sufficient. It need not be 
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US$100 000 to US$200 000
171 a year, compared to US$50 000 base pay for a Navy 
Seal or Green Beret counterpart.
172 Having said that, however, there are some who 
argue that those UN member states who contribute to UN peacekeeping forces (aka 
"disguised mercenaries")
173 also "do so largely for financial reasons".
174 This leaves 
many academics questioning what kind of legal p roof of such motivation would 
satisfy a court of law.
175  Others suggest that international law needs to develop 
further  to  deal  with  foreign  fighters  whose  motivation  is  monetary  as  well  as 
ideological, the so-called "confessional mercenaries".
176 All things considered, this 
leaves us questioning to what extent PSCs would fall foul of this definitional criterion. 
To our minds  this  is  probably  the  one  criteri on  that  PSCs might  easily  satisfy 
(especially in  the case of the  OAU  Mercenary  Convention,  which  requires  only 
compensation,  not  necessarily  excessive  compensation.)
177  However, as the six 
criteria are cumulative, PSCs would still escape being categorised as mercenaries 
provided they did not satisfy the other five criteria. 
 
The fourth requirement is an exemption of sorts for all PSCs who are nationals of a 
party to the conflict, or residents of a territory controlled by a  party to the conflict. 
Paradoxically PSCs emanating from states party to the conflict (for example the US 
or UK in the case of Iraq) would au tomatically be exempt from mercenary status 
under the fourth criteri on,
178  while fellow employees of the same private security 
company would not enjoy this exemption as a result of their citizenship or residence 
alone. It seems that a very easy way round thi s requirement is for contracting firms 
to invite foreign PSCs to take up residence in a state party to the conflict prior to their 
deployment  to  the  conflict  zone,  thereby  affording  them  the  right  to  claim  this 
residency exemption. 
 
                                            
171  Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 885 cites figures of US$ 20 000 a month for PSCs deployed in 
Iraq. 
172  Lytton 2006 Or Rev Int'l L 334. With figures like this being bandied about it is no wonder that the 
special forces of the US and UK are experiencing a "brain drain" (Salzman 2008 Int'l L & Politics 
885). 
173  Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2615-2616. 
174  Member states who contribute soldiers to a UN operation could earn $988 per month, per soldier 
(Fountain 2005 Mich St J Int'l L 243). 
175  Diplock Report para 7; Fallah 2006 IRRC 605, Gumedze 2007 ASR 27. 
176  For example the Arab fighters employed by the Taliban (Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2637). 
177  Article 1 OAU Mercenary Convention. 
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The fifth requirement, like the fourth, operates as an exemption for all PSCs who are 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. As already discussed in some 
detail above, the likelihood of PSCs being incorporated into a state's armed forces is 
remote,
179 although not completely without precedent.
180 Gillard
181 suggests that the 
following indicators might be used to argue that PSCs have been incorporated into 
the state's armed forces: where there is a national law stipulating such incorporation; 
where PSCs are employed by the department of defence; where PSCs are subject to 
military disciplinary  structures/a  chain of command/a  military hierarchy;  or  where 
PSCs wear uniforms or carry identity cards as envisaged by  GC III. In most cases, 
however, given the reticence of states to officially incorporate PSCs into their armed 
forces, the majority of PSCs will not be able to rely on this exemption to escape 
mercenary status. 
 
The final exemption available to PSCs seeking to avoid mercenary status comes into 
effect if they can show that they have "been sent by a State which is not a Party to 
the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces".
182 This last exemption 
extends the previous criteria (of incorporation into the armed forces) to those who 
are sent by a state which is not party to the armed conflict. Some  would argue that 
where a state has contracted PSCs (although not officially incorporating them into 
their armed forces) the contract of employment is sufficient to conclude that they are 
contractors of the employing state
183 and entitled to claim this exemption. Ironically, 
an individual hired by a humanitarian NGO to assist with the delivery of civilian relief 
aid would not be able to claim this exemption, despite  his or her laudable motives 
and IHL-endorsed mandate.
184 
 
In conclusion then, while it seems in theory possible for a PSC (in the context of an 
international armed conflict) to fulfill all of the requirements of the IHL definition of a 
                                            
179  Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 5. 
180  This was in fact the case for Sandline in Papua New Guinea in 1997 and Executive Outcomes in 
Sierra Leone (Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2641; Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 124). In the case of 
Sandline they  were granted the status of  "special constables" under the laws of Papua New 
Guinea so that they could carry out their functions (Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 38.) 
181  Gillard 2005 www.icrc.org 5. 
182  Article 47(2) AP I. 
183  Maogoto and Sheehy 2006 Bepress Legal Series 20; Frye 2005 Fordham L Rev 2646. 
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mercenary, this would be unlikely. Moreover, provided PSCs refrain from any direct 
participation in hostilities, their activities will also not be "prohibited by recognised 
international  norms".
185  In  the  final  analysis ,  PSCs  will  most  likely  be  label led 
civilians or  "persons accompanying the armed forces ". The infamous quote from 
Geoffrey Best regarding mercenaries is even more applicable to the situa tion of 
PSCs: 
 
the definition of a mercenary in these instruments is so unworkable and riddled with 
loopholes  that  any  mercenary  who  cannot  exclude  himself  from  this  definition 
deserves to be shot – and his lawyer with him.
186  
 
Some have argued that the difficulties plaguing the international law definition of a 
mercenary have been of assistance to the private security industry, leaving PSCs in 
a "sort of legal limbo",
187 rather than giving PSCs pause to consider the legality of 
their actions. To be fair, the provisions prohibiting mercenaries were never drafted 
with PSCs in mind, and this is especially true when those PSCs are employed by 
"recognised regimes"
188 and by those very states and  regional organisations which 
had spearheaded the IHL anti-mercenary provisions.
189 If this is the legal situation in 
terms of IHL and international treaty law  dealing with mercenaries, it is perplexing 
that South Africa has taken such an aggressive stance to wards PSCs, particularly 
when other PSC supplier states are favouring a move towards regulation rather than 
outright prohibition. The effect of the FMA and its intended successor (the PMA) is to 
make the highly skilled ex-apartheid army personnel (who are mostly white) persona 
non grata inside our borders.  
 
                                            
185  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 117. 
186  Best Humanity in Warfare 374. 
187  Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 7. 
188  Zarate 1998 Stan J Int'l L 117. 
189  Both  Nigeria  and  Angola  have  employed  the  services  of  PSCs  and  even  the  OAU  has 
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4  South Africa's anti-mercenary legislation in the light of the international 
law approach to mercenaries
190 
 
Only  a  small  number  of  states  have  taken  steps  to  enact  domestic  legislation 
specifically  aimed  at  regulating  the  PSC industry  within  their  territory.
191  Many of 
these instances of regulation have come about to end a state's reputation for being a 
recruiting  ground  for  "dogs  of  war "  eager  to  part icipate  in  dirty  conflicts,  coup 
attempts, and human rights abuses.
192 In an era which witnessed the South African-
based  Executive  Outcomes  and  Logo  Logistics  heav y  involvement  in  conflict 
situations in Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe, it is not surprising that 
the South African government busied i tself with drafting the  Regulation of Foreign 
Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (FMA), which entered into force on 18 September 
1998,  and  remains  applicable  to  date.  The  FMA  was  "the  first  of  its  type  in  the 
world",
193 and is widely regarded as adopting  "unquestionably…the most hard-line 
'anti-mercenary' stance in the international sphere".
194 What is particularly interesting 
is that South Africa should choose to adopt such a tough approach on PSCs when it 
is party to  neither the  OAU  nor  the  UN  Mercenary  Conventions.
195  Its  domestic 
legislation exceeds the international law obligations set out in either of the anti -
mercenary conventions.
196 
 
                                            
190  The  authors  are  indebted  to  Adv  Max  Du  Plessis  for  affording  us  access  to  the  Ex  Parte 
submissions  made  to  the  president  on  behalf  of  a  South  African  Private  Security  Company 
providing security services in Iraq. 
191  The French Penal Code criminalises mercenary activity and prescribes sanctions of up to five 
years imprisonment or a fine of 75 000 Euros. In terms of Italian Penal Law a number of offences 
are criminalised, including the participation of any person in an armed conflict of a state in which 
he/she does not reside or have relating citizenship. Switzerland's Penal Code prohibits Swiss 
nationals from participating in foreign military service without the approval of the Swiss Federal 
Council.  Under  Sierra  Leone's  National  Security  and  Central  Intelligence  Act  10  of  2002  the 
granting of licenses to companies that are used to provide security services are regulated by 
government. The United States of America have several pieces of legislation applicable to PSCs, 
including  the  Military  Extraterritorial  Jurisdiction  Act,  2000,  the  International  Traffic  in  Arms 
Regulations, 1979 and the Arms Export Control Act 22 USC 2778. 
192  Gillard 2006 IRRC 528; Drury 2009 www.dailymail.co.uk. 
193  IRIN 2008 www.itinnew.org.  
194  Baker and Gumedze 2007 ASR 4. 
195  Singer 2006 BJWA 105; Abrisketa 2007 FRIDE Comment 2; Cullen 2000 Conflict Trends 36; 
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The  FMA  prohibits  the  recruitment,  use,  training  or  financing  of  mercenary 
activities,
197  and  defines  mercenary  activity  as  the   "direct  participation  as  a 
combatant in armed conflict for private gain ".
198  This mirrors closely the type of 
conduct prohibited under  AP I and the two  Mercenary Conventions.
199 The FMA, 
however,  goes  further  and  also  prohibits  the  rendering  of  any  foreign  military 
assistance
200  without  prior  authorisation  from  the  National  Conventional  Arms 
Control  Committee  (NCACC).
201  Under  the  FMA,  the  term  "foreign  military 
assistance" includes within its ambit a range of activities including providing military 
assistance to a party to an armed conflict, and providing security services for the 
protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or their property. Excluded from 
the parameters of "foreign military assistance" are humanitarian or civilian activities 
aimed at relieving the plight of civilians in an area of armed conflict.
202 Any person 
guilty of rendering foreign military assistance without the necessary permission or 
who fails to observe the conditions
203 attached to that permission will be guilty of an 
offence and liable to a fine or a period of imprisonment or both.
204 
 
The South African approach to the PSC industry is markedly different from the 
response which PSCs have received from other governments. Britain , for example, 
has adopted an approach that "recognises the industry's positive and legitimate role 
globally, as well as the graphic extent of arenas in which PMCs operate".
205 Britain 
has consequently set out options for  the regulation of PSCs in a Green  Paper and 
the  British  government  is  currently  considering  a  way  forward  based  on  the 
responses  to  the  Green  Paper.
206  In  the  USA   the  provision  of  military/defence 
                                            
197  Section 2 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 (FMA). 
198  Section 1(iv) FMA. 
199  The UN Mercenary Convention and the OAU Mercenary Convention. 
200  Section 3 FMA. 
201  A person who wishes to engage in foreign military assistance has to make an application to the 
NCACC  (s  4(1)  or  5(1)).  The  committee  will  then  consider  the  application  and  make  a 
recommendation to the Minister of Defence on whether to accept or reject the application (s 4(2) 
or 5(3)). The Minister may then refuse or grant the application subject to certain conditions. The 
Minister may also at any time withdraw or amend any such authorisation (s 4(3)). 
202  Section 1(iii) FMA. 
203  Also  see  s  8(1).  The  FMA  does  not  prescribe  a  maximum  fine  or  maximum  period  of 
imprisonment for offences. 
204  Section 8(1) FMA. 
205  FCO 2009 www.fco.gov.uk 5. 
206  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu. S BOSCH AND M MARITZ                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
97 / 261 
 
services  is  regulated  by  the  US  Arms  Export  Control  Act.
207  The US legislation 
defines "defence services" to include the provision of military advice and the training 
of foreign units and forces,
208 thereby covering the tasks often performed by PSCs. 
Furthermore, the United States Department of Defence has issued directives
209 that 
apply to contractors and their employees, including all non -US personnel who are 
employed by these contractors and who may have authorisation to accompany the 
US armed forces, once again a common practice in the PSC industry. Furthermore , 
the  Military  Extraterritorial  Jurisdiction  Act
210  establishes  federal  jurisdiction  over 
offences committed by any person employed by or accompanying the US armed 
forces  committed  outside  the  United  States,  potentially  bringing  PSCs  squarely 
within the US courts' jurisdiction regardless of the fact that they might be foreign 
nationals and have committed their offences outside of US territory. However, owing 
to some definitional ambiguities this Act has been successfully utilised only once, to 
prosecute a contractor who was found with child pornography at the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq.
211 Most recently, in 2007, following the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib, 
the scope of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
212 was extended to include PSCs, 
and  strictly  prohibits  any  form  of  cruelty  or  oppression  of  prisoners.
213  The US 
legislators have chosen to monitor and regulate the activities of PSCs while in Sierra 
Leone, private security companies are required to undergo an assessment before 
they are granted a licence
214 to provide "security services" in terms of the  National 
Security and Central Intelligence Act 10 of 2002.
215 At most a company might face 
the revocation of  its licence, but once the licen ce has been granted there are no 
further duties or penalties placed upon PSCs.
216 Belgian legislation, promulgated in 
                                            
207  Arms Export Control Act 22 USC 2778. This act is implemented through the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations 1976 (as amended); Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu. 
208  FCO 2002 www.fco.gov.uk. 
209  These  directives  inter  alia  authorise  third-country  nationals  and  host  nation  personnel  to 
accompany US Armed Forces. See for instance Department of Defence Directive 2311.01E of 9 
May 2006 (as amended) and Department of Defence 2005 www.dtic.mil. 
210  Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (Public Law 106-523). 
211  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu. 
212  Uniform Code of Military Justice US Code Title 10 Subtitle A Part II Chapter 47. 
213  Uniform Code of Military Justice US Code Title 10 Subtitle A Part II Chapter 47. 
214  Foreign  firms  who  would  like  to  make  use  of  Sierra  Leonean  employees  must  submit  their 
request to the Ministry of Labour, which will provide them with suitable personnel (Gomez del 
Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 19). 
215  In this act, security services are defined as "such services connected with the security of the 
State as the National Security Council may determine" (Part I para 1, Part V para 19(9) National 
Security and Central Intelligence Act 10 of 2002); Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 19. 
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2003,  penalises
217  the recruitment of any persons with the intent of  serving in a 
foreign army in the territory of a foreign state, but does not prohibit law enforcement 
operations authorised by public law organisations to which Belgium is a party.
218 No 
other state has adopted the hard -line approach towards PSCs  which characterises 
the South African legislation - not even other states which are prolific suppliers of 
PSCs. 
 
It is not surprising that the efficacy of South Africa 's FMA has been undermined by 
"its lack of support by other international actors, notably the US and UK".
219 Without 
their  support  South Africa has managed to prosecute  only  a handful of PSCs, 
despite there being  an estimated 2000 to  4000 South African citizens working as 
PSCs in Iraq.
220  Academics speculate that the legislation is likely  "to push the 
industry underground", with PSCs more likely to opt for a change in citizenship in 
order to avoid prosecution.
221 Already the legislation has forced Executive Outcomes 
to move its operations outside South Africa's borders, although this has not stopped 
it recruiting South Africans for work in Sierra Leone and Angola.
222  
 
After only a few high profile prosecutions it became clear that the  FMA was flawed, 
and this led to the Department of Defence rushing through its replacement Act, the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of 
Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (hereinafter the PMA). The PMA received Presidential 
assent  in  November  2007,  but  has  yet  to  receive  the  necessary  presidential 
proclamation and regulations to make it law. Under the PMA 
 
2(1) No person may within the Republic or elsewhere -  
(a) Participate as a combatant for private gain in an armed conflict; 
(b) Directly or indirectly recruit, use, train, support or finance a combatant for private 
gain in an armed conflict; 
(c) Directly  or  indirectly  participate  in  any  manner  in  the  initiation,  causing  or 
furthering of  
(i) An armed conflict; 
(ii) A coup d'etat, uprising or rebellion against any government; or 
                                            
217  With a maximum of a two-year prison term. 
218  Gomez del Prado 2008 www.law.wisc.edu 14. 
219  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 241. 
220  Gaston 2008 Harv Int'l L J 241; Hodge 2006 www.slate.com. 
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(d) Directly or  indirectly perform any act  aimed at overthrowing a government or 
undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state.
223 
 
Much like the FMA, the PMA provides that all forms of foreign military assistance
224 
must be authorised
225 if provided to a party to an armed conflict, or in a regulated 
country.
226 Not only does the NCACC have the authority to attach conditions
227 to its 
authorisation of any foreign military assistance, but section 9 of the  PMA sets out a 
broad set of grounds upon which the NCACC can draw to justify its refusal of such 
authorisation. It can refuse authorisation if foreign military assistance: 
 
(a) is in conflict with the Republic's obligations in terms of international law; 
(b) would result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the territory where the assistance or service is to be rendered or the exemption 
granted; 
(c) endangers the peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into the 
region or territory where the assistance or service, or humanitarian aid, is or is likely 
to be, provided or rendered; 
(d)  would contribute to regional instability or  negatively influence the balance of 
power in such region or territory; 
(e)  in  any  manner  supports  or  encourages  any  terrorist  activity  or  terrorist  and 
related  activities,  as  defined  in  section  1  of  the  Protection  of  Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act No 33 of 2004); 
(f) contributes to the escalation of regional conflicts; 
(g) in any manner initiates, causes or furthers an armed conflict, or a coup d'etat, 
uprising or rebellion against a government; or 
(h) prejudices the Republic's national or international interests. 
 
What  is of  particular  concern,  from  an  administrative  law  perspective,  is  that  the 
wording of section 9 will make it extremely easy for the NCACC to deny an applicant 
the required authorisation, thereby infringing his or her constitutional right to practise 
a profession, without even granting him or her a hearing. Furthermore, neither the 
FMA nor the PMA provides any guidelines to the NCACC on how the conditions 
                                            
223  Section 2 FMA. 
224  The activities that form part of the provision of foreign military  assistance are set out  in s 3 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in the Country of Armed 
Conflict Act 27 of 2006 (PMA). 
225  A person seeking such authorisation must submit an application to the NCACC, which considers 
the application and may refuse it or grant the application subject to such conditions as it may 
determine, or at any time withdraw or amend an authorisation already granted (s 7(2) PMA). 
226  The NCACC can inform the National Executive that it is of the opinion that an armed conflict 
exists or is imminent in any country, and that it is of the opinion that such a country should be 
proclaimed as a regulated country. The President may then, by proclamation in the Government 
Gazette, proclaim any country as a regulated country for the purposes of the PMA (ss 6(1), 6(2)). 
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referred  to  in  section  7(2)  should  be  determined.
228  Even more  worrying  is the 
possibility that at any time the NCACC may withdraw or amend its authorisation,
229 
exposing individuals to potential prosecution. 
 
The net effect for South African citizens employed as PSCs is that their opportunities 
to seek employment abroad rest entirely in the hands of the NCACC, which not only 
has the power to designate the "regulated countries" but also has the right to refuse 
applications to provide foreign m ilitary assistance, or to set conditions for such 
permission and retract authorisation at any time. This leaves South African PSCs in 
the unenviable position of being potentially liable for prosecution for actions that IHL 
and  anti-mercenary  treaties  do  no t  prohibit,  solely  because  of  their  citizenship. 
Moreover, their potential employers now perceive South African PSCs as a liability 
rather than an asset, given the bureaucratic demands, indeterminant conditions, and 
the looming possibility that authorisati on can be retracted mid -contract.
230  South 
African PSCs who are already enlisted in the armed forces of another country or 
employed as PSCs by foreign companies would be well advised to accept   the 
citizenship or residency of that country in order to avoid th e risk of prosecution by 
virtue of their South African citizenship.
231 
 
5  Challenges facing the prosecution of PSCs under the FMA and future 
PMA 
 
It did not take many attempted prosecutions in terms of the FMA for the Minister of 
Defence to realise that the legislation was flawed.
232 Richard Rouget was the first 
man to be charged under the  FMA for "recruiting mercenaries for the conflict in the 
Ivory Coast".
 233 Rouget pleaded guilty to recruiting persons for military assistance, 
which  included  logistical  support  and  the  provision  of  equipment,  and  was  fined 
R100 000 for contravening the FMA. On appeal the fine was reduced to R75 000 by 
                                            
228  Sections 4(3), 5(3) PMA. 
229  Section 7(2)(c) PMA. 
230  Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 11. 
231  Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 11. 
232  The Minister of Defence conceded in his explanatory memorandum to the Bill that despite the 
fact that the FMA had been in operation for considerable time, very few prosecutions had been 
instituted in terms of the Act (Le Roux 2008 www.iss.co.za). 
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the Pretoria High Court.
234 In February 2004 Carl Alberts was arrested for alleged 
mercenary activities in the Ivory Coast. Alberts was sentenced to two years in jail or 
a fine of R20  000. However,  after entering a plea bargain agreement with the 
National Prosecuting Authority his jail time was suspended and in the end  Alberts 
only paid a fine of R10 000.
235 In March 2004, only one month after Alberts had been 
arrested, the now infamous coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea started unfolding. 
Sixty-two South African citizens who were implicated in the alleged plot to overthrow 
the government of Equatorial Guinea were returned to South Africa  in 2005 after 
spending a year in Zimbabwe's Chikurubi prison for immigration offences.
236 Upon 
their return to South Africa eight of these men were charged with violating the 
FMA.
237 Crause Steyl pleaded guilty to  "participating in a conspiracy to execute a 
coup" in Equatorial Guinea and was fined R200 000 or ten years imprisonment with 
a further five years suspended for five years.
238  Louwrens Horn and Hermanus 
Carelse undertook to assist the NPA in further investigations and as a result of a 
plea bargain were  each fined R75  000. Sir Mark Thatcher (who is by far the most 
prominent prosecution thus far under the FMA)
239 pleaded guilty on a lesser charge, 
admitting that his actions may have recklessly contributed to the financing of the 
coup plot. He was ordered to  pay a fine of R3 million and received a four -year 
suspended  sentence.
240  The  remaining  eight  accused  were  subject  to  a  full 
prosecution  in  terms  of  the  FMA  (a  rare  occurrence)
241  and  all  eight  were 
acquitted
242 on the ground that the charges could not be proved.
243 
 
If one looks over the history of attempted prosecutions under the  FMA it is evident 
that the FMA has never been thoroughly applied by the courts.
244 Instead the NPA 
has in most cases opted for plea bargain agreements. It is telling that there has yet 
                                            
234  Recently Rouget was alleged to be active in Iraq, a clear indication that his punishment under the 
FMA did not serve as a proper deterrent (Taljaard ″Implementing South Africa's FMA″ 175). 
235  Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's FMA" 175, 176. 
236  BBC News 2009 news.bbc.co.uk. 
237  Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's FMA" 177. 
238  Jacobs 2008 Strateg Rev S Afr 2. 
239  Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's FMA" 179. 
240  Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's FMA" 179. 
241  Taljaard "Implementing South Africa's FMA" 179. 
242  Case unreported. 
243  Oelofse 2007 www.mg.co.za. The accused were RS Archer, V Dracula, L du Preez, E Harris, M 
Kashama,  NT  Mathias,  HJ  Hamman  and  S  Witherspoon.  Pretoria  Regional  Court  Case  No 
14/4315/05 (unreported); Hibbitts 2007 jurist.law.pitt.edu. 
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to  be  a  successful  prosecution  on  the  facts  in  terms  of  the  FMA  without  a  plea 
bargain  which  resulted  in  a  guilty  verdict.  Some  cite  the  potential  for  serious 
constitutional challenges to the FMA as the reason for all of the prosecutions ending 
in plea bargains and fines, with little or no jail time.
245 Another interesting observation 
flowing from these attempted prosecutions is that all  of the prosecutions under the 
FMA have been reserved for genuine mercenaries and coup plotters. To date no 
persons participating in what could be classified as non-mercenary security services 
have faced prosecution under the FMA. It is likely that the same difficulties regarding 
constitutional challenges will plague any prosecutions under the PMA if it were to be 
rigidly applied to PSCs. If the track record of prosecutions under the FMA is anything 
to  go  by,  PSCs  providing  non-mercenary  support  services  abroad  are  likely  to 
escape prosecution, as the NPA seems to focus on traditional mercenaries and coup 
plotters.  Although  by  law  any  PSCs  engaged  in  unauthorised  foreign  military 
assistance are liable for prosecution, it is unlikely that the NPA will be successful in 
prosecuting the large number of South African citizens working abroad in this field - 
that is, not without first overcoming some damning constitutional challenges to its 
legislation. 
 
For those South African PSCs providing peaceful support services in conflict-torn 
regions,  there  is  a  strong  case  to  be  made  that  their  activities  (which  are  not 
criminalised  under  international  law)  are  being  unfairly  criminalised  under  this 
domestic legislation.
246 Not only is there no international law obligation upon South 
Africa  to  criminalise  the  actions  of  PSCs  (provided  they  are  not  acting  as 
mercenaries), but as we have already  shown,  the international community as a 
whole is overwhelmingly in favour of regulating rather than outlawing PSCs. The far-
reaching impact of the FMA will potentially have the effect of criminalising activities 
that were perfectly legal in the territories where they were being committed, solely 
because they were committed by South African citizens, permanent South African 
residents, or South African juristic persons. Moreover, foreign nationals who seek to 
recruit  PSCs  on  South  African  soil  without  the  NCACC's  authorisation  could  find 
                                            
245  Abrhams 2008 privatesecurityregulation.net 2. 
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themselves in difficulty with the law.
247 These provisions have already sent South 
African  private  security  companies  scampering  to  reinvent  themselves  as 
corporations incorporated under foreign law and located anywhere but on South 
African soil in order to avoid being targeted by this legislation. Moreover ,  South 
Africa has no obligation in international law to regulate the activities of South African 
nationals on foreign soil, or foreign nationals on South African soil, so long as the ir 
actions fall short of the international obligations to prohibit mercenary activities, and it 
seems clear that as international law stands at the moment PSCs are not necessarily 
classified  as  mercenaries.
248  In  fact,  even  in  terms  of  the  OAU  Mercenary 
Convention, African states are still permitted to hire non-nationals to perform security 
functions,  although  as  it  stands  OAU  members  would  be  well  advised  to  avoid 
recruiting South African nationals, residents or juristic persons, and certainly not to 
carry out any recruiting on South African soil.  
 
Another possible avenue for challenging the FMA (and its successor the PMA) lies in 
administrative  law.  In  terms  of  the  FMA  and  the  PMA  any  authorisation  to  offer 
foreign military assistance has to come from the NCACC. The legislation lists several 
grounds upon which the NCACC must refuse an application to offer foreign military 
assistance.
249  The  difficulty  which  faces  the  NCACC  in  carrying  out  this 
administrative function is that these factors are broadly stated, e xtensive in their 
scope,  and couched in vague terms, making it almost impossible for a potential 
applicant to assess the likelihood of being granted the required authorisation. South 
African administrative law demands that while the discretionary powers ascribed to a 
body (like the NCACC) may be broadly formulated, the factors relevant to the 
exercise of such discretionary powers must be indisputably clear.
250 This is not the 
case with section 7 of the FMA or section 3 of the PMA. What is indisputably clear is 
that  these  vague  grounds for refusing  an  application for authorisation  will almost 
always provide a means of justifying the refusal of any application which the NCACC 
disapproves of, especially  where  that  disapproval is motivated  by  private  political 
agendas. If, as we predict, authorisation will in most instances be denied, the onus 
                                            
247  See s 11(1) FMA. 
248  Kaunda v The President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) Chaskalson CJ 
paras 38-40. 
249  Section 7 FMA and s 3 PMA. 
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rests on the individual PSCs to request reasons from the NCACC in terms of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (hereafter PAJA).
251 However, as correctly 
pointed out  by  Du  Plessis
252  in his  Ex  Parte  submission  to  the  president,  any 
meaningful  decision  regarding  an  application  for  authorisation  can  be  taken  only 
after an extensive evaluation process. To this end, true administrative justice could 
be  achieved  only  if  each  applicant  were  permitted  to  make  representations  to 
convince the NCACC that his application would not infringe any of the grounds set 
out in section 9 of the Bill. Regretfully this audience with the NCACC is not granted 
by the legislation at the time when the application is under consideration. This leaves 
an unsuccessful applicant burdened unnecessarily with having to rely on PAJA and 
the courts to challenge unfair administrative decisions. Where PSCs are sought on 
short  notice  to  respond  to  an  unfolding  humanitarian  disaster  (post  conflict),  the 
bureaucratic delay in getting the necessary NCACC authorisation as a result of the 
over-reaching  impact  of  the  legislation  will  almost  always  mean  that  non-South 
African citizens will be favoured. 
 
With the potential for the NCACC to readily deny authorisation, or at least to force 
PSCs to make use of PAJA to challenge an unsuccessful application, comes the real 
concern that these decisions by the NCACC will necessarily impact negatively on the 
individual PSC's right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely as set out 
in  section  22  of  the  Constitution.
253  In terms of  the  Constitution, a  South  African 
citizen's choice of trade, occupation or profession may be regulated only by a law 
that is reasonable and justifiable and rationally connected to a legitimate government 
purpose.
254 Unfortunately the implementation of the  FMA (and soon the PMA) will 
potentially prohibit a whole range of noble activities which are currently carried out by 
PSCs. The vague terms in which the legislation is couched might deny authorisation 
to  both  the  traditional  "mercenary"  and  the  PSCs  who  are  employed  to  guard 
vulnerable NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in war-torn regions. Likewise, 
the PSCs who are involved in legitimate de-mining operations in war-torn regions 
                                            
251  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA); s 7(5) PMA provides that any person 
that feels aggrieved by the decision taken about his application may apply for written reasons as 
provided for in PAJA. 
252  See note 191 above. 
253  Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
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might be tarred with the same brush as the coup plotters. These potentially absurd 
consequences speak to the vague, arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustifiable manner 
in  which  the  FMA  and  future  PMA  impact  on  the  constitutional  rights  of  PSCs. 
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how prohibiting their assistance in projects aimed 
at restoring human rights and ameliorating civilian suffering can be connected to any 
legitimate government purpose. Rather, it is widely recognised that civilian security 
services  and  humanitarian  assistance  training  are  essential  for  post-conflict 
reconstruction, and may be vital to protect and restore human rights in countries 
affected by conflict. 
 
The FMA, and its successor the PMA face a myriad of constitutional, administrative 
law and international law challenges should they ever be actively pursued in a court, 
rather than being used to coerce plea bargains, as has been the experience to date. 
Perhaps  these  obstacles  have  catalysed  the  newest  initiative  (in  terms  of 
amendments to the South African Citizenship Act)
255 planned by the government to 
eradicate the problem of the politically embarrassing yet burgeoning South African 
private security industry. 
 
6  Denying  Citizenship  to  PSCs:  enforcing  the  FMA  and  future  PMA 
through other avenues 
 
In 2010 the South African government announced a proposed amendment to section 
6
256 of the South African Citizenship Act.
257 The proposal permits the government to 
revoke the citizenship of any South African serving in a foreign military for "engaging 
in a war under the flag of a country that the Government of South Africa does not 
support".
258 The concept of  a "foreign military" is not defined in the Bill, but could 
conceivably apply to South African PSCs who are co ntracted to assist the armed 
forces of a foreign state.
259 According to the Department of Home Affairs Director 
                                            
255  South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. 
256  South African Citizenship Amendment Bill B[17-2010]. 
257  The South African Citizenship Amendment Act will add subsection (c) to the already existing s 6 
of the South African Citizenship Act. 
258  DefenceWeb 2010 www.defenceweb.co.za. 
259  This bill would, however, not have any effect on South African PSCs who are not serving in a 
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General, Mkuslei Apleni, this amendment is aimed only at naturalised South African 
citizens  (i.e.  immigrants),  but there  is nothing  in  the proposed  amendment  which 
shows that these provisions will not also be applied to non-immigrant citizens.
260 The 
potential  consequences  for  this  proposed  amendment  could  have  far -reaching 
effects for many PSCs currently serving abroad under contracts to foreign armi es. It 
is  not  clear  which  specific  conflicts  will  attain  the  status  of  a  war  that  "the 
Government of the Republic does not support ". So, for example, a South African 
citizen employed as a PSC in Palestine acting as a bodyguard to Israeli government 
officials might find himself not only sought for prosecution under the FMA, but facing 
the revocation of his South African citizenship. As a result of the potential fall-out 
from this proposed amendment, Paul Boateng, in his capacity as High Commissioner 
for the UK Foreign Office, lobbied the South African government to ensure that the 
800 plus South Africans who are part of the British army were not forced to renounce 
their South African citizenship.
261 The ANC government rejected the petition, stating 
that such a provision would "create loopholes allowing South Africans not only to join 
foreign armies but also become mercenaries with companies such as Aegis ”.
262 We 
wait with bated breath to see what will become of the proposed bill ,  which has 
already drawn condemnation from the private security industry and legal  academics 
alike. 
 
Given the poor track record of successful prosecutions of PSCs under the FMA and 
the likelihood that its successor the PMA will face the same legal difficulties, it seems 
that this new initiative aimed at PSCs is simply a new way for South Africa to rid itself 
of  its  pesky  international reputation  as a fertile  hunting  ground for those  seeking 
"guns for hire". 
 
                                            
260  DefenceWeb 2010 www.defenceweb.co.za. 
261  Drury 2009 www.dailymail.co.uk. 
262  Paul Boateng quit his position as a British MP to become a director of Aegis Defence Services 
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7  Conclusion 
 
One of the unique features which differentiate present-day armed conflicts from their 
predecessors is the pivotal role played by PSCs. We feel it is imperative to analyse 
the role played by PSCs in armed conflicts and begin to theorise how IHL might 
respond to this new animal. To this end we have argued that those few PSCs who 
are  officially  incorporated  into  the  armed  forces  of  a  state  should  enjoy  primary 
combatant status, although state practice shows that this is an unlikely occurrence. 
In instances where PSCs are contracted by states to assist their armed forces and 
provide non-lethal services, we propose that they be categorised with those "persons 
accompanying  the  armed  forces"  for  the  purposes  of  IHL.  As  for  the  rest,  we 
conclude  that  they  will  be  categorised  as  civilians,  and  provided  they  do  not 
participate directly in hostilities and restrict their activities to defensive
263 guarding of 
civilian sites, they cannot be targeted or labelled as unlawful belligerents. 
 
There is a great deal of public sentiment, fuelled by media reports of coup attempts, 
which has, perhaps unfairly, seen all PSCs labelled as mercenaries. Our exploration 
of both IHL and the two Mercenary Conventions reveals that while it seems in theory 
possible for a PSC (in the context of an international armed conflict) to fulfill all of the 
requirements of the IHL definition of a mercenary, this is unlikely. Consequently we 
conclude that the label  “mercenary”  is  not  particularly  useful  in  devising  a  legal 
regime that can deal with the presence of PSCs in modern armed conflicts. 
 
Within this legal framework it is perplexing that South African legislation has taken 
such an aggressive stance towards PSCs. The aggressive overreaching legislation 
has vested the NCACC with very broad grounds upon which to refuse, retract or set 
restrictive conditions for any PSC seeking authorisation to work abroad. Not only are 
these requirements particularly onerous for South African PSCs, but they are not 
                                            
263 Some academics like Schmitt (Schmitt 2004 Chi J Int'l L 541 and Schmitt 2005 Chi J Int'l L 529) 
argue that any participation in hostilities (offensive or defensive) strips PSCs of their essentially 
civilian status and renders them unlawful belligerents. We have argued that a more nuanced 
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practised  by  any  other  state,  nor  are  they  required  by  any  international  legal 
obligation. The net effect is to unreasonably and unjustifiably limit the constitutional 
right  of  PSCs  to  practise  their  profession,  and  to  force  South  African  citizens  to 
denounce their citizenship in order to avoid prosecution. The FMA, and its successor 
the PMA, face a myriad of constitutional, administrative law and international law 
challenges should they ever be actively pursued in a court. We hope that debating 
these  issues  will  give  government  pause  to  consider  the  impact  of  its  existing 
legislation and expose the planned amendments to the South African Citizenship Act 
for what they really are  – a backdoor means  by which to deny the constitutional 
rights of the South African PSC. 
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